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Case Notes

Infant Pain and Suffering: The
Valuation Dilemma*

The Supreme Court of California has recently granted the request of an infant plaintiff seeking damages for pain and suffering
incidental to an illness contracted during birth and lasting only
throughout the first year of the child's life. The opinion, through
necessary reliance on vague precedent, reaches a logical and humane result. But the potential problems of valuation of such damages can only add to the burden the trial courts face in attempting
to equate pain and suffering with monetary awards; and the case
underscores the need for clearer guidelines.
Kim Capelouto, the infant plaintiff, was born at a Kaiser Foundation hospital on July 30, 1964. During her stay in the hospital nursery ward Kim became infected with a contagious disease caused by
salmonella bacteria. The disease originated from the mother of
another baby in the ward, whose child contracted the bacteria at
birth. Salmonella spreads by transmission from the stools of an
infected person to the mouth of the recipient, generally via some
neutral medium such as unwashed hands. The unwashed hands
in this case belonged to hospital employees working in the nursery; this eventually led to the infection of Kim and thirteen other
babies in the hospital nursery.
* Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal. 3d 889, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (1972).
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The illness contracted by Kim in the nursery persisted throughout her entire first year, and necessitated hospitalization six times
before she was completely cured. During her illness Kim suffered
from projectile vomiting, severe diarrhea, dehydration, cramps and
shock. The dehydration necessitated intravenous feeding, and at
one point her condition was sufficiently deteriorated to endanger
her life. Kim ultimately recovered completely from the illness, suffering no permanent disability physically or mentally.
Through her guardian ad litem, Kim brought suit against the defendant hospital to recover both general and special damages. At
the trial a number of experts testified on behalf of the plaintiffs,
including Kim's doctor, a public health nurse consultant and representatives of the State Department of Health, doctors from the
hospital, and an expert on salmonella infection and epidemics. But
none of these witnesses testified that pain would be a consequence
of the infection, that a newborn baby would experience pain from
the infection, or that Kim had in fact experienced pain from the infection. Accordingly, the court granted defendant hospital's request to instruct the jury as follows: "You are not permitted to
award Kim Capelouto damages for physical pain and mental suffering which, although possible, is under the law incapable of proof
because of the age of the child."' The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff for the exact amount of medical expenses, $1,510.24.
After the trial court denied Kim's motion for a new trial the Capeloutos appealed.
The main issue on appeal was the propriety of the jury instruction precluding an award for pain and suffering. 2 The Second
District Court discussed the source of the instruction, Babb v. Murray,3 and concluded that although the instruction was erroneous,
it did not constitute reversible error. The notion of inferring pain
and suffering was rejected; in the absence of direct proof of pain,
Kim could not recover. 4 In Babb, a three and one-half month old
baby girl suffered a fracture of both femurs in an automobile accident; she underwent traction and remained in the hospital for five
1. 7 Cal. 3d at 892, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
2. Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 21 Cal. App. 3d 568, 98
Cal. Rptr. 631 (1971).
3. 26 Cal. App. 2d 153, 79 P.2d 159 (1938).

4. 98 Cal. Rptr. at 633.

weeks. That court held that an infant so young did not know what
happened to her, and not knowing, was without fear or anguish.
In examining this reasoning, the Appellate Court decided the Babb
court was wrong. An infant who cannot suffer fear or mental anguish can nevertheless experience pain; but damages for pain may
be recovered only upon proof of its existence, and the Capeloutos
had failed to offer such proof. Perhaps the most remarkable example of the Appellate Court's rationale is this statement regarding
the type of distress suffered by Kim Capelouto: "Nor were Kim's
injuries such that pain could necessarily be inferred. The symptoms of crying, vomiting, and diarrhea are hardly distinguishable
from characteristics exhibited by other newborn children." 5
Undaunted by the Appellate Court's logic, the Capeloutos appealed to the California Supreme Court, where Justice Tobriner,
writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower decisions and
granted a new trial limited to the issue of damages.6
The Supreme Court considered three issues on appeal: the propriety of the instruction, the viability of recovery for pain and suffering in the absence of expert testimony, and the proper scope of
a possible new trial.
Reviewing the reasons for allowing pain and suffering damages
in cases involving personal injury, the court pointed out that the
unitary concept of pain and suffering has served as a convenient
label under which a plaintiff may recover not only for physical
pain, but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension,
terror or ordeal. 7 Although these terms refer to subjective states,
representing a detriment which can be translated into monetary
loss only with great difficulty, the detriment, nevertheless, is a
genuine one that requires compensation. 8 "The issue generally
must be resolved by the impartial conscience and judgment of
jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in
harmony with the evidence."9
The court then reasoned that since recovery for mental pain and
5. Id. at 633-34.

6. 7 Cal. 3d at 898, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
7. Id. at 892; see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426
P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal.Rptr. 135, 140, (1967).

8. 7 Cal. 3d at 893. Compare 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil
sec. 14.13 (5th ed. 1969), and ALEXANDER, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL
ISSUES sec. 3-436 to 3-441.

9. 7 Cal. 3d at 893; see Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 181, 417 P.2d
673, 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 137 (1966); cf. Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit

Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 507, 364 P.2d 337, 343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1961).
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suffering is often the principal amount of damages sought in tort
actions, the instruction allowed by the trial court was contra to
the basic principles governing damages in tort cases. Turning to

the source of the instruction, Justice Tobriner launched a vigorous
attack on Babb v. Murray. Certainly the fact that an infant of
such tender age could not understand the cause of pain and suffering did not justify the ultimate conclusion of Babb. In reference
to that case, Witkin noted that "the court seems to have confused
capacity to suffer with ability to discover the cause of the pain."'10
The Capelouto court reasoned that we know from human experience that infants can feel pain and discomfort even if they do not
know the source of it.
The infant's inability to explain the cause of pain or to describe
the extent of it does not affect the sting of it. Indeed, the infant's
cry of hurt is as poignant as the most detailed exposition. The
moan of the injured child, who may even be unconscious, needs no
elaboration in descriptive language. Communication flows from all
manner of sounds and gestures; it is not confined to brittle or inadequate words. The inarticulate anguish of the infant serves as
much a ground for recovery as the adult's most sophisticated description."
Justice Tobriner concluded by saying that "Babb deserves no resurrection from its well-earned obscurity. '12 The obscurity referred
to is that enjoyed by a case decided in 1938 and yet never once cited,
as controlling or otherwise, until the instant case.
At this point the court made a statement not entirely consistent

with its prior line of reasoning. The statement is disturbing not
because it is invalid, but because of its doubtful relevance in the
instant case. The court said that "Since Babb, the decisions have
upheld recoveries by young children for pain and suffering and
3
have encountered no special problem in so doing.""1
In support of
this statement two cases were cited: Crane v. Smith,14 and Chinnis
v. Pomona Pump Co."5 But upon an analysis of these cases we find
that they involve situations far removed from the critical issues
presented by the facts of Capelouto. Crane does not even mention
10. 2 W=IN,

SUMMARY

OF CAL.

LAW

at 1615.
11. 7 Cal. 3d at 894, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
12. Id. at 895, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
13. Id. at 894-95, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
14. 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1943).
15. 36 Cal. App. 2d 633, 98 P.2d 560 (1940).

(7th ed. 1960) Torts, § 411,

pain and suffering, and bases its award on a permanent disfigurement of a three-year-old girl (loss of a finger), "considering the
effect which such a physical defect may have upon the child's
mental state as well as her choice of future employment."' 6 In
Chinnis, two children, ages five and ten years, were injured in an
automobile accident. Again there is no mention of pain and suffering, but merely a description of injuries involving multiple fractures and some slight permanent disfigurements (including a cavedin cheek bone and a slight knock-knee condition). 17 Note that in
each case the children were much older than Kim Capelouto, and
their damage awards were based largely on compensation for permanent injuries. This distinction will be discussed at length infra.
Turning to the question of the absence of medical testimony, Justice Tobriner discounted its significance. Although expert testimony is helpful, it should not be required to establish a basis for
an award for pain. The significance of lay testimony was stressed,
noting that courts have long upheld the admissibility of such evidence. "Even if the infant may not be able to testify as to his own
pain, his burden should not be made heavier by foreclosure of nonexpert testimony."18

And finally, the court ruled that "even in the absence of any explicit evidence showing pain, the jury may infer such pain, if the
injury is such that the jury in its common experience knows it is
normally accompanied by pain."' 9 Here the Supreme Court expanded the rationale begun by the Appellate Court, for it was
willing to forego the necessity of direct testimony of the existence
of pain, and to infer its existence from the description of the child's
symptoms alone. The sumptoms of Kim's illness, i.e., evidence of
extreme dehydration, diarrhea, vomiting, weight loss requiring intravenous feeding and the insertion of catheters into her stomach,
together compel an inference of her pain and suffering. "Thus we
do not face a situation in which the jury was given only the cold
medical diagnosis of salmonellosis; we have here, instead, detailed
descriptions of symptoms from which the jury would be impelled
to infer some pain and suffering.

' 20

Regarding the scope of a possible new trial, the court reasoned
that since defendant's liability for negligence was so clear-cut, (evidence at the trial court supported this conclusion), the only neces16. 23 Cal. 2d at 302, 144 P.2d at 364.
17. 36 Cal. App. 2d at 642-43, 98 P.2d at 566-67.
18. 7 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
19. Id. at 896, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
20. Id. at 897, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
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sary issue on a new trial is that of the damages recovered. Such a
result is logical where the jury returned a verdict on the exact
amount of medical expenses incurred, which was the most it could
award plaintiff pursuant to the trial judge's instructions. "The
instruction to the jury precluding an award of damages for pain
and suffering was both erroneous and prejudicial, requiring the or'21
der of a limited new trial on the issue of damages."
It is not the purpose of this note to criticize the final Capelouto
decision; the opinion deserves merit, for it reaches a sound result.
My purpose is twofold: First, it is to give notice to the legal as
well as lay community that a decision has been rendered allowing
recovery for pain and suffering by an infant plaintiff, proof of
which may in some cases be inferred from both expert and lay testimony. But it is the second objective, to which we now turn our
discussion, to note the potentially difficult problems of valuation
of pain and suffering awards in cases similar to the Capelouto situation.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court surveyed the
area of pain and suffering awards; however, neither tribunal considered, nor was it asked to consider, the problems of valuation
presented to the trial courts where such awards are fashioned.
The subject was given the usual cursory examination, and it is
presumed that the general rule of allowing a "reasonable" award
for pain and suffering damages is to be applied at the subsequent
damage issue trial.22 Let us now explore the applicability of such
a general rule where the plaintiff is an infant of the tender age of
Kim Capelouto.
Crane v. Smith and Chinnis v. Pomona Pump Co., cited by the
Supreme Court as evidence that California has allowed pain and
suffering recoveries for infant plaintiffs in the past, are good examples of the scant case law on infant pain and suffering available in
this state. As mentioned supra, neither case should be considered
as controlling where the narrow issue of Capelouto is involved; the
ages of the plaintiffs and the injuries they suffered clearly distinguish them. The significance of this distinction becomes appar21. Id. at 898, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
22. Cf. Beagle v. Vasold, supra, note 9, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 172, 417 P.2d 673,
675, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131 (1966).

ent when we recall that Kim Capelouto was ill only during the
first twelve months of her life, and that she recovered completely
from the illness, with no lasting effects. 23 In the Crane and Chinnis
cases, as in all instances where there is a possibility of some future
pain and suffering flowing from the original harm, the award for
those damages was based on the reasonable compensation for the
distress the plaintiffs would suffer in the future, as well as that
experienced during the illness or original trauma. The Capelouto
facts warrant a recovery for pain suffered during the course of the
illness only, for Kim was not permanently injured.
The Capelouto decisionleaves us with the problem of determining a "reasonable" value, in dollars and cents, of a damage recovery that will fully compensate the infant plaintiff. But there are
no real guidelines from which a reasonable amount can be calculated. California law on this particular subject is practically nonexistent; most cases involving recoveries by infant plaintiffs for
pain and suffering have little to do with the actual compensation
for having suffered pain, but are more concerned with compensation for lasting physical deformities, loss of future wages, future
pain and suffering, embarrassment due to physical defects, and
other factors which indeed warrant monetary consideration, but
24
which were not in issue in the Capelouto case.
Because pain is subjective, the difficulty in proving its existence
and measuring its severity are major obstacles in attempting to
fashion a realistic damage award. Proof of the existence of pain
has received adequate attention; the Capelouto court allowed an
inference of its existence from the symptoms of the plaintiff's illness. But methods of measurement are conspicuously absent in
most cases, due primarily to the subjectivity enigma. According
to one authority on the grading of pain, it is classified as a subjective symptom which necessarily varies with the pain tolerance of
the individual. A slight impairment may cause severe pain, and
the reverse situation is also possible. There is no standard of measurement, but it may be possible to grade levels of pain according to
how the subject's normal functions are affected.2 5 Another writer.
discussing the tolerance of patients to discomfort, notes:
There is no method by which pain can be weighed, measured, as-

sayed or reasonably estimated, because the variables and its abil23. 7 Cal. 3d at 891, 103 Cal. Rptr' at 858.
24. See Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1943); Chinnis v.
Pomona Pump Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 633, 98 P.2d 560 (1940); and Martinez v.
Moore, 221 Cal. App. 2d 516, 34 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
25.

E.

McBRIDE,

DISABILITY

OF COMPENSABLE INJURIES

EVALUATION

AND

52-53 (6th ed. 1963).

PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT
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ity to affect an individual vary not only from person to person but
from day to day in the same person. All one can do is draw on
his experience and state that other patients with other injuries reacted thus and so. In this fashion
one can compare roughly the
26
extent of discomfort and of pain.

One result of this measurement problem is the dispute among
members of the legal community over the propriety of awarding
money damages for pain and suffering. Those favoring such
awards argue that a monetary judgment is the only plausible means
of compensating the aggrieved plaintiff. Since money is considered a "good" by our society, it should be given the victim in an
attempt to repay him for his loss of a pain-free life. "The award
of money is, at best, only an attempt at compensation, but it is better than nothing. How much is given, of course, must depend upon
the current attitude of society as represented by the jury or other
fact-finder. '27 Taking the opposite stand, Louis L. Jaffe makes
an impressive argument against pain and suffering awards because
of their impact on insurance. Jaffe claims that pain and suffering is
nothing more than "parasitic damage". The plaintiff should not be
compensated in money for an experience which involves no financial loss. Considering the insurance ramifications, "it is doubtful
that the pooled social fund of savings should be charged with sums
of indeterminate amount when compensation performs no specific
economic function.

'2

However, Jaffe notes that since the plaintiff

doesn't usually get full compensation for the costs incurred by litigation, "the award for pain and suffering might be measured
and justified in terms of a contribution to the real costs of the litigation.

'29

Perhaps the best example of the current trend of the law regarding pain and suffering recoveries is evidenced by the Jack H. Werchick article, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick,30 which was

cited by the Supreme Court in Capelouto.3 1 Werchick begins by
noting that damages for pain and suffering are not "unmeasurable
IN THE WAKE OF TRAUMA 350-51 (1957).
27. J. Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal

26. J. BROOKE,

Injury Litigation,3

DUKE

L.J. 344, 377-78 (1962).

28. L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance,
18 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 223-25 (1953).
29. Id. at 234-35.
30. 17 HAST. L.J. 263 (1965).
31. 7 Cal. 3d at 893.

damages" at all, but that they are required to be compensated for
when proximately resulting from the defendant's tortious conduct.
He cites the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 910, which says: "A person
injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from
him for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused by
the tort. '32 Werchick stresses the need for a uniform method for
valuation by the judge or jury of damages for pain and suffering.
The large number of personal injury cases demands such a system.
"Since the valuation of damages for pain and suffering presents
one of the greatest and most unique challenges to the successful
administration of justice, it is necessary that our judicial system
'33
adopt a uniform solution.
Regarding methods of proof and the use of expert testimony, Mr.
Werchick mentions something of particular importance to our discussion:
Even if it be assumed that the particular injuries, although painful
or debilitating, are common or are difficult to describe in terms of
psychological and somatic effects, the physician can offer analogies
within the ready comprehension of the jury. In any event, the
medical expert can be asked to explain the mechanics of the particular injury and the effects of that injury on the nervous, mental,
and somatic state of the plaintiff. Comparison
with the commonly
34
experienced disabilities is then possible.

Note the reference to "analogies within the ready comprehension
of the jury," and to "comparison with the commonly experienced
disabilities." Query what standard the jury can use to refer and
compare to, when the plaintiff is a newborn infant.
In his conclusion the author makes several pertinent observations. As an alternative to the "per diem" argument (discussed
infra) he suggests either "legislation eliminating compensation for
pain and suffering or substitution of a 'commission' or 'master' or
'referee' system for court and jury trials in determining awards in
tort cases." 35 But such practices, he says, are contrary to our mores
and sense of fair play. And trials by jury tend to be more equitable than trials by commission. Finally, Mr. Werchick urges
greater confidence in our judicial system and in our trial judges.
The courts are well equipped to protect the jury from bias or prejudice. "The argument that jurors may mistake the arguments of
plaintiff's counsel for evidence is not persuasive; the law presumes
that jurors have sufficient mental capacity to discriminate between
32. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 910 (1939).
33. 17 HAST. L.J. at 266.
34. Id. at 272-73.
35. Id. at 284.
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evidence and argument." 36
California has consistently endorsed the use of the jury to determine a fair and reasonable recovery for damages for pain and suffering. In a 1966 case, styled Beagle v. Vasold,3 7 the current California view was expressed by Justice Mosk. Pain and suffering
damages present one of the most difficult compensation problems,
because no method is available by which the jury can objectively
evaluate such damages. "In a very real sense, the jury is asked
to evaluate in terms of money a detriment for which monetary
compensation cannot be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy. ' 38 Citing McCormick's text on Damages, Justice Mosk emphasized the reliance on the jury:
Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an
arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently the judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in
their discretion they may consider reasonable....
The chief reliance, for reaching reasonable results in attempting to
value suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common sense of the jury....39
Once the jury has made a determination, presumably through impartial conscience and reasonable judgment, an appellate court will
hesitate to reverse or revise a pain and suffering award. "An appellate court can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict is so large that, at first
blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the jury. ' 40 So an appellate court will
not act unless the verdict is so out of line with reason that it could
only be the result of passion and prejudice. 41 The question of
whether an award is so great as to shock the conscience of the appellate judges and necessarily imply prejudicial jury involvement
"depends upon the nature and extent of the victim's injuries, his
pain, suffering and humiliation, and the amount of special dam' 42
ages that may have been incorporated in the total award.
.36. Id. at 284-85.
37. 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966).
38. Id. at 172, 417 P.2d at 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
39. Id.
40. Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 507, 364 P.2d
337, 343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1961).
41. Henninger v. Southern Pacific Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 76 (1967).
42. Id. at 882-83, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 80.

Three methods have been developed to facilitate the task of the
jury charged with fashioning a pain and suffering award: they include (1) reading the prayer, (2) the "golden rule" argument, and
(3) the "per diem" argument. The first system allows plaintiff's
counsel, in argument, to inform the jury of the total amount demanded in the prayer of the complaint. This is a commonly accepted practice, and was given express judicial approval by the
Beagle v. Vasold opinion. 43 The second method, which essentially
asks the jurors to place themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff in
order to determine the value they would place on undergoing
equivalent pain and suffering, was treated with indifference in
Beagle, where the court observed "We do not imply that we also
approve the so-called 'golden rule' argument. '44 The third argument, published in 1951 by Melvin Belli, 45 is aptly described by Witkin:
The 'per diem' argument is a strategic device, conceived by plaintiffs' lawyers, which suggests to the jury that a stated sum be
awarded for each day or other chosen period of suffering undergone
by the plaintiff. Its object is to overcome the inherent uncertainty
in this element of damages by giving the jury
46 something which
appears more certain-a mathematical formula.

Although generally associated with calculating a sum which will
compensate the plaintiff for pain to be suffered in the future, the
"per diem" method can be used to convert any period of painful
experience into a monetary figure. As a crude example, if the
plaintiff suffered pain valued at one dollar per day for a full year,
the pain and suffering award, via the "per diem" formula, would
be 365 dollars (or 366 for a leap year).
As one might expect, the "per diem "argument has been the subject of vigorous controversy since its inception. 47 Perhaps the best
expression of the opposition to allowing "per diem" calculations is
found in two dissenting opinions written by Justice Traynor. The
first, in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, warns of the dangers
of arriving at a specific sum for a particular period of pain and suffering. Multiplying that figure by the plaintiff's estimated life expectancy only multiplies the hazards of conjecture. "Counsel could
arrive at any amount he wished by adjusting either the period of
time to be taken as the measure or the amount surmised for, the
43. 65 Cal. 2d at 172, 417 P.2d at 675, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
44. Id. at 182, 417 P.2d at 682, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 138.

45. M. Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22
Miss. L.J. 284 (1951).

46.

WITKIN, SUMMARY

OF CAL. LAw

(1969 Supp. to Vol. 2) Torts, §

411-B, at 785.

47. For a list of related articles, see Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 175,
417 P.2d at 677, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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pain for that period.

' 48

The second dissent appeared in Beagle v.

Vasold, where California formally accepted the "per diem" argument:
Since the jury must convert pain and suffering into dollars and
cents, counsel should be permitted to advance any reasonable argument as to what its decision should be. Since there is no mathematical formula for such conversion, however, an argument that
the jury should use such a formula is suspect, and an argument
that damages for pain and suffering should be computed at so
much per unit of time is so misleading that it should never be allowed ....
None of these formulas appears unreasonable on its face, for there
is no basis in human experience for testing their reasonableness
...It is therefore unrealistic to seek an appropriate award for
49
pain and suffering by the use of any so-called per diem formula.

Although the jury is not bound to apply the formula suggested
by plaintiff's counsel, the choice is tempting. The "per diem" for-

mula appears deceptively accurate, and it is this illusion of certainty that is its most objectionable aspect. A jury might easily
be impressed with a mathematical formula that offers a simple
solution to an almost insurmountable problem.50
The decisions above, concerning problems of valuation and measurement of pain and suffering recoveries, did not involve infant
plaintiffs. None approach the limited Capelouto situation, and the
lack of California law on this subject has already been noted. Most
cases dealing with young children inevitably include lasting in-

juries, and the same appears to be true for many other jurisdictions. 51 However, there is a recent Federal Court decision for the
Southern District of New York which provides a good example of
a case at least partly on point with Capelouto5 2 There the defendant drug company manufactured a defective vaccine which was
administered to the three-month-old plaintiff. As a result of the
drug the child developed convulsive seizures, permanent paralysis
in both right limbs, and suffered brain damage resulting in a permanent mental age of five months.
48. 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, (dissenting opinion).
49. 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, (concurring and dissenting opinion).
50. "Per Diem" Damages: The Controversy Continues, 18 HAST. L.J.
684, 688 (1967).
51. The three cases cited by the Capelouto court, 7 Cal. 3d at 894, note
4, each involve older children with permanent injuries.
52. Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).

After an extensive examination of the factors considered by the
trial court (including past and future medical expenses, loss of
child's services, and loss of future earnings) the Court of Appeals
upheld a pain and suffering award of 400,000 dollars. In so doing
the court noted the drastic medical treatments the child had suffered through, and concluded that the ability to reason and understand, or the lack of such ability, would not diminish the amount of
pain the infant had experienced and must continue to endure.
"Since the infant plaintiff is estimated to have a mental age of five
months, and he is not comatose, there is ample support for the finding that he was capable of suffering 'pain' in its direct, primary
sense. '53 This enormous award was obviously based on the future
suffering of the plaintiff (the trial court found he had a reasonable
life expectancy of fifty years), but the rationale for allowing any
recovery at all is the significant point, not the extent to which it
was allowed. In essence, the court held that a person with the
mental capabilities of a five-month-old infant can feel and suffer
pain which is legally compensable. Unfortunately the only apparent standards of valuation, aside from the projected life expectancy,
were the shocking extent of the damages suffered by the infant,
and the failure of the other damages awarded to ease the conscience of the court.
Whenever an infant plaintiff is involved, the problems of valuation and measurement of pain and suffering damages are magnified beyond the usual levels reached in cases dealing with adult
plaintiffs. Our discussion of the "per diem" argument indicates
that such magnification is not necessary in an area already plagued
by speculation and uncertainty. Justice Traynor's dissent in the
Beagle case (supra) becomes particularly cogent when applied to a
"per diem" calculation of a very young infant's pain and suffering.
Note the key phrase: "None of these formulas appears unreasonable on its face, for there is no basis in human experience for testing their reasonableness. '5 4 What basis is there in human experience for attempting to correlate the pain suffered by a newborn
baby to an adult's endurance or threshold for pain? And taking
the next logical step, how can we put a dollar value on that basis?
The jury has no way of relating to the plaintiff in a manner which
will allow any rational means of calculating a fair recovery. What
standard can be used? How much would the child spend to be
free from the pain it endures? If the usual procedures for measure53. Id. at 55.

54. Beagle v. Vasold, supra note 49, at 183-84, 417 P.2d at 683, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 139.
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ment are used, which amount to nothing more than a guess tempered by the common sense of the jurors, then aren't we paving
the way for emotional and prejudicial involvement to distort and
complicate the jury's task?
Our discussion has placed considerable emphasis on the tender
age of Kim Capelouto. We have referred to her age, and the fact
that she suffered no lasting effects of her illness, as comprising the
limited issues distinguishing the Capelouto situation from the more
common infact pain and suffering cases. The remainder of our
analysis will be directed, in an admittedly theoretical context, toward the importance of this age factor.
The emphasis on age is critical for these reasons. After a child
reaches two, or perhaps three years, we are dealing with more
of a "person", capable of expressing to some degree of rationality
the existence and severity of pain caused by illness or injury. But
a newborn baby has no way to communicate these feelings to its
parents or doctor, and certainly not to a jury. Is it not possible for
such a child, whose perception of the real world may be limited to
nothing more than a blur of light and sound and tactile response,
to be acutely aware of the painful illness or injury it enduresperhaps even more so than an adult or older child with the ability
to comprehend the nature of the discomfort and alleviate its distress to some degree?
Cases involving children in this age range will be encountered
more frequently as the law begins to expand the rights of juveniles
to a level commensurate with those of adults. If the infant plaintiff is to be afforded the same status as an adult in all aspects of
the law, then our courts should be prepared to cope with, or at
least for now, to recognize the special problems these cases pose.
Prospective defendants (hospitals, physicians, insurance companies,
etc.) may benefit as well by a better definition of their rights and
liabilities, particularly in an area where substantial monetary judgments are not uncommon. Certainly any effort to minimize speculation and formulate more specific guidelines for the trial courts
and juries charged with fashioning pain and suffering awards
would be encouraged and appreciated.
PETER N. KALIONZES

